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In 2015, Chinese factories produced more than 800 million metric tons of steel—nearly eight times 
as much as the United States produced in the same year and more than the entire world produced in 
1995. By all accounts, that figure reflects an overcapacity problem: China's big steel firms are 
increasingly turning to foreign markets to absorb their excess output, but because of lower prices 
and reduced domestic demand, they are still struggling to make money, losing nearly $10 billion in 
2015. 
It's not just China's steel sector that suffers from an overcapacity problem. The country is pumping 
out too much of other industrial products, too, including coal, aluminum, and copper wire. 
To its credit, the Chinese government has recognized the need to make cuts to the country's 
industrial sector. In January, Beijing pledged to trim steel production by between 100 million and 
150 million metric tons per year, and in February, it announced plans to cut around 500,000 jobs 
from the sector. Cuts to production and employment levels in the coal industry will be even steeper. 
Beijing's main tool for reducing excess industrial capacity is the reform of China's giant state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), something it has been trying to do since the late 1970s. In the 1980s, Beijing 
sought to make individual state-owned factories responsible for their financial performance by, for 
example, moving their accounts out of the state budget and onto separate income statements. In 
the 1990s, Chinese officials attempted to turn legacy communist production units into modern 
corporations. And in the first decade of this century, Beijing consolidated its oversight of SOEs by 
creating so-called state asset management committees, with the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission at the top of the pyramid. 
Throughout the course of these reforms, the Chinese state, and the Communist Party in particular, 
has kept a firm grip on the top management of SOEs. The government uses SOEs to support official 
policy, even appointing government bureaucrats as company executives (usually with massive 
increases in pay relative to their previous government salaries). But recently, as SOEs in many 
sectors have suffered big losses, such control has been less rewarding. In the past, Beijing has sought 
to address this problem by privatizing or shuttering smaller SOEs and maintaining control over the 
country's larger, more profitable ones—a practice that the government of Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin introduced in the 1990s under the slogan of "grasping the large and letting go of the small." 
Today, Beijing is considering relaxing government control through further privatizations, at least in 
loss-making sectors such as mining, manufacturing, and other heavy industries. In theory, privatized 
companies will get professional managers and independent boards. In practice, no one knows 
exactly what to expect, perhaps not even the Chinese government itself. 
What is more certain is that the wave of reform will result in the firing of many workers in the 
industrial sector—1.8 million of them in the coal and steel industries alone. Beijing has pledged to 
spend $15 billion a year to mitigate the impact on workers, largely by retraining them and relocating 
them to areas where job opportunities are growing, and provincial governments will spend a similar 
amount. Those funds will be desperately needed to cushion the impact of restructuring. But it is just 
as likely that the money will be siphoned off as a sweetener to entice private sector companies to 
take over, and eventually close down, loss-making SOEs. 
THE MANCHURIAN MODEL 
The model for the latest wave of SOE reforms may be the harsh transformation of China's industrial 
northeast over the past decade. Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning Provinces, which form an emerging 
rust belt in the region historically known as Manchuria, were long shielded from major market 
reforms, but since the early years of this century, they have been ground zero for China's industrial 
restructuring. Hundreds of mines and factories have been closed, thousands of workers have been 
laid off, and companies have been closed so that their land could be turned over to real estate 
developers. Plant closures have failed to boost growth in the region, but they have at least reduced 
the state's expenses by eliminating government subsidies for unprofitable SOEs. As China faces 
increasingly constrained budgets, officials in Beijing may see that as good enough—so China's 
leadership may be ready to roll out a similar reform model nationwide. 
Beijing's recent attempts to downsize the northeast's SOEs date to at least 2004. That year, Wang 
Min became the governor of Jilin Province, where he would later serve as the provincial party 
secretary. By the end of 2005, Wang had overseen the sale of more than 800 SOEs, many of them 
apparently given away to private owners. Most of these privatizations flew below the radar of the 
international media—until 2009, when workers at a steel plant in the city of Tonghua rioted against 
its privatization and killed a factory manager who had been sent in to enforce job cuts. (The 
privatization went ahead anyway, and the episode didn't seem to hurt Wang's career: later that 
year, he was appointed party chief of the much larger Liaoning Province, presumably with 
instructions to continue the downsizing.) 
Wang, a one-time protégé of Jiang's and a member of Jiang's "Shanghai clique," appears to have 
fallen out of favor under the rule of Chinese President Xi Jinping: he was investigated for corruption 
and removed from office earlier this month. But in China's northeast, the privatizations will 
continue. The downsizing at Longmay Group, northeastern China's largest coal company, is 
illustrative. Facing public protests over plans to lay off 100,000 workers at the state-owned 
company, Lu Hao, the governor of Heilongjiang Province, has admitted that the firm had failed to 
pay its miners for months. But he has been unapologetic about its end goal—which will require the 
firing of some 40 percent of the company's workers. 
In short, it seems that the Chinese government is determined to shed excess industrial capacity at its 
loss-making SOEs, no matter the political or human cost. China's northeastern provinces aren’t the 
only ones to have faced these restructurings, which have since targeted other relatively poor 
provinces with large industrial sectors, such as Shandong and Shanxi Provinces. We'll know that 
Beijing is serious about putting SOEs on a market footing—and not simply cutting its losses in 
oversupplied sectors—if it starts privatizing profitable firms in richer provinces and cities, such as 
Guangdong and Shanghai. 
KEEP THEM CLOSE 
There is no official figure for the cumulative size of China's SOEs, but by most accounts, state-owned 
firms make up somewhere between one-third and one-half of China's economy. Not all of these 
companies are heavy industrial dinosaurs, and many of them are making money. Although profits in 
the SOE sector fell in 2015, they still amounted to some $350 billion, and some of China's SOEs are 
among the largest companies in the world. 
The Communist Party has no intention of letting go of China's profitable SOEs. In fact, the guidelines 
for reform released by the central government in September suggest that the party will be directly 
involved in the appointment of SOE managers, that party personnel will serve rotations in key 
corporate roles, and that each company's party secretary will chair its board of directors. Of course, 
this calls into question just how independent and professional the management of the reformed 
companies will be: to foreign observers, such plans might seem more like a Russian-style attempt to 
privatize China's economy by giving it away to the party nomenklatura than like real reform. 
But China's leadership clearly does not want to repeat the mistakes that Russia made during the 
1990s. It has a cleaner model of crony capitalism in mind: Singapore, which was ranked fifth in the 
world on a "crony capitalism index" published by The Economist in 2014 but whose state-owned 
firms are still widely admired and generally profitable. China's economy and population are orders of 
magnitude larger than Singapore's, however, and the revenues of some of its largest SOEs are higher 
than Singapore's entire GDP. It seems unlikely that China will be able to emulate Singapore's success. 
More likely is that Beijing's SOE reforms will advance the model it has already tested in China's 
industrial northeast. Loss-making enterprises will be sold off and closed, and profitable ones will be 
kept close to the party state. Company directors and CEOs who find themselves on the right side of 
the political divide will gain fabulous wealth, and those on the wrong side of the political divide will 
be charged with corruption and removed. Post-reform China may look a lot like pre-reform China, 
but with better managed companies and more than a few new billionaires. 
